Building aircraft carriers that float on land
Falcon Talon, Golden Bee, Hydra Coil and other "agile combat employments"
The latest thing in the U.S. military is Agile Combat Employment, operating aircraft from obscure locations. Think something akin to an aircraft carrier operating on land, with fighters and bombers hopscotching their way around to obscure airfields and civilian airports to avoid enemy attack and establish new beachheads from which to fight. ACE practices that dispersal, and in 2022, the military services — primarily the Air Force — carried out dozens of exercises practicing the skills both in the United States and in at least 35 foreign countries, from Norway to Australia. It all sounds logical and prudent, except when you scratch the surface and think about how real wars are fought.
Agile Combat Employment exercises in 2022: Accurate Test, Adirondack Warrior, Agile Phoenix, Agile Rage, Agile Spartan, Bushwhacker, Falcon Strike, Falcon Talon, Global Dexterity, Golden Bee, Hoʻoikaika, Hydra Coil, Northern Agility, Oktober Fist, Patriot Fury, Sentry Savannah, Thanos
The belief on the part of the Pentagon is that the main operating bases will be put out of action from Chinese and Russian bombing and missile attacks, necessitating dispersal. The bomber community started practicing ACE operations in 2019, dispersing to locations around the globe on a tight timeline. During its practice, bombers landed at a location, received whatever maintenance it required, rearmed and resupplied and were back in the air, in theory before any adversary could pinpoint their location.
In December 2021, the Air Force released Air Force Doctrine Note 1-21, Agile Combat Employment stating that “… ACE shifts operations from centralized physical infrastructures to a network of smaller, dispersed locations that can complicate adversary planning and provide more options for joint force commanders.” Under the new doctrine, forces would practice and prepare for ACE operations, and support packages — airfield operations, communications, fuel, munitions, even medical care — would be prepared. ACE “complicates the enemy’s targeting process, creates political and operational dilemmas for the enemy, and creates flexibility for friendly forces,” the note said.
After the Ukraine invasion, the Air Force issued its vision for operating in “modern, contested environments” last June. For Europe, the new vision addresses what some call the “tyranny of proximity,” Russia’s constant and short-range threat to Eastern Europe. For Asia and the Pacific, it is the “tyranny of distance,” operating over thousands of miles from China.
Especially after the Russian invasion of Ukraine last February, Agile Combat Employment (ACE) became the happening thing, with US aicraft deploying throughout Europe. And as CENTCOM in the Middle East shifted so much of its attention towards big war with Iran, similarly US aircraft practiced more and more dispersal operations, most notably in Israel, Oman and Pakistan. In the Pacific, ACE was practiced in Australia, Guam, Japan, Northern Marianas, Philippines, and South Korea (at least those are the ones known).
After almost a year, the Ukrainian air force continues to fly from airbases and airports thoughout the country, somewhat contradicting the entire notion of ACE, at least in Europe. The Russians are just not that competent. True, the Ukrainian have been practicing their own version of dispersal and hide-and-seek, but Russia has had a hard time disabling airfields. In other words, Russian missiles are not quite their yet for long-range (and sustained) attack. On another note, as the war has stretched out in a year, the number of missiles is also having an impact; Russia is running low on inventory. If it can’t attack airfields, or if it doesn’t have enough weapons to keep them out of action, why bother with ACE?
Against China, perhaps ACE makes more sense (assuming competence and inventory on the part of Beijing), but here, focusing on ports seems more important than airfields. Ships are the only way to move large amounts of people and heavy equipment such as tanks. Here’s where the political dimension of ACE comes into play — aligning and obligating more and more nations to be on the US side where a NATO-type alliance doesn’t exist. If you’ve conducted military exercises and practiced using your bases for American dispersal, you’re in.
ACE conceptually makes sense as another skillset for the military, but whether high intensity combat ala Ukraine can be sustained from dispersal bases is questionable because of the very volume of munitions and missiles that would have to accompany those dispersing fighters and bombers. One would have to move an enormous amount of munitions and build up a pretty big inventory to sustain combat and then, voila, the dispersal base starts to look like a main operating base — the modern-day Catch 22.